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Secured Transactions
In Personal Property

and the Federal-Provincial Conflict
in Canadian Bankruptcy Law
Jacob S. Ziegel*
I. INTRODUCTION

Unlike Australia and the United States, Canada does not have a separate
bankruptcy court. The Canadian federal government has the power to
establish a bankruptcy court,I but it has elected not to do so. Instead, section
183 of the Federal Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act2 (BIA) confers original,
auxiliary, and ancillary jurisdiction in bankruptcy, at law and in equity, on the
superior courts in each of the provinces and the Yukon Territory. Section 183
also confers appellate jurisdiction in bankruptcy matters on the regular
provincial courts of appeal and on the Supreme Court of Canada.3 It is
common inCanada to speak of the "Bankruptcy Court," but this colloquialism
merely means that a particular superior court is exercising its section 183
jurisdiction.'
Despite the absence of an autonomous bankruptcy court,
jurisdictional questions do arise from time to time. For example, a party may

* Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Toronto. This is the modestly revised version
of a paper delivered by the author at a conference on Courts and Jurisdiction in Federal States
held at the University of South Carolina School of Law on November 17-19, 1994.
1. The Parliament of Canada has the power, "from Time to Time [to] provide for the
Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of a General Court of Appeal for Canada, and for
the Establishment of any additional Courts for the better Administration of the Laws of Canada."
CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1867) § 101.
2. R.S.C., ch. B-3 (1985), amendedby STAT. CAN. 1992, ch. 27 (Can.).
3. The BIA sets out substantive rules to be applied by the superior court when it sits in
bankruptcy. Where the BIA is silent, the substantive rules to be applied will be the federal and
provincial laws that would be applied by the court sitting in its regular capacity. As far
procedural rules are concerned, § 4 of the General Rules underthe BIA (SOR/92/57590) provides
that the practice of the court in civil matters, in cases not provided for by the Act or the Rules,
applies to proceedings under the Act or the Rules.
4. Section 185 of the BIA authorizes the chief justices of the provincial superior courts to
nominate or assign one or more judges in their courts to exercise the powers and jurisdiction of
the superior court under the BIA. However, the exercise of this power neither makes the
nominated judge(s) personadesignatanor does it deprive non-nominated members of the superior
court from continuing to exercise their bankruptcy jurisdiction. See Dominion Shipbuilding &
Repair Co., 3 D.L.R. 274 (Ont. 1926); Re Holley, 26 D.L.R. 4th 230 (Ont. Ct. App. 1986).
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object that a proceeding has been launched before a superior court in its civil
capacity when it should have been addressed to the court in its bankruptcy
capacity.' Such objections, however, are only procedural in character, have
no constitutional dimension, and do not affect the substantive principles of law
in issue in the litigation.
This being the case, I may now safely turn to the topic on which I had
originally agreed to contribute this short paper. The topic involves a small, but
constitutionally and economically important, fragment of the larger interface
between federal and provincial powers. The problem for consideration is to
what extent the federal government's insolvency powers6 in Canada can and
should be used to alter the order of distribution of a debtor's estate in
bankruptcy from the priorities that would be applied under provincial (and,
sometimes, federal) law outside the debtor's bankruptcy.
II. THE ROLE OF SECURED CREDIT IN THE MODERN ECONOMY
To enable the reader to appreciate the nature of the problem, I must begin
with a sketch of the role of secured credit in modem economies and the
evolution of Canada's chattel security law. 7
Access to large amounts of credit for commercial and consumer purposes,
on a short-, medium-, or long-term basis, is the lubricant without which
modem economies could not survive. In Canada, the outstanding volume of
commercial and consumer credit at any time, not including credit extended to
the various levels of government, runs to several hundred billion dollars. The
volume of consumer credit alone, not including loans secured by residential
mortgages, amounts to over sixty billion dollars.
Although much credit is unsecured, creditors frequently will insist on
security to ensure payment of the debt.' Whether security is required, and
will be given, will depend on a variety of factors: the size and duration of the
credit, the bargaining strengths of the parties, the debtor's credit rating, and
the cost of the credit. For the typical consumer, however, and for all but the

5. The case law is collected in 2 HOULDEN & MORAWETZ, BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY
LAW OF CANADA §§ 1-7 (3rd ed. 1992); B. Boucher, "La Jurisdictionde ]a Cour de Faillite: une
Perspective Quebecoise," 24 C.B.R.3d 61 (1994) (collecting case law for Quebec).
6. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1867) § 91(21).
7. In this paper "secured transactions," "security in personal property," and "chattel
security" are used interchangeably. Historically, common-law jurisdictions treated security in
realty (immoveables) separately from security in personal property (movables). Although the
difference has little significance in bankruptcy law, at the suggestion of the organizers of this
conference, this paper is confined to the chattel security issues.
8. From an economic perspective, there is no difference between "vendor credit" and "lender
credit." In common-law jurisdictions, the two types of credit have long been treated differently
for legal purposes. Unless otherwise indicated, the difference will be ignored in this paper.
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largest blue-ribbon corporations, the granting of security will be de rigueur
where substantial amounts of credit are being sought.
A creditor has important reasons for seeking security. The most
important reason is to be able to realize the collateral if the debtor fails to pay
or becomes insolvent. In a typical insolvency, an unsecured ordinary creditor
will recover five cents or less on the dollar. Secured creditors, on the other
hand, can expect to recover fifty percent or more of what is owing to them.
Another important reason encouraging a creditor to seek security is to obtain
leverage over the debtor. An unsecured creditor can only threaten to sue or
to deny the debtor further credit. Neither option may make much impact on
a recalcitrant debtor or one who is facing pressures from a variety of sources.
Debtors cannot afford to be so cavalier in their dealings with a secured
creditor since they know the secured creditor can always seize the collateral
and bring the business to a halt if the debtors fail to cooperate. A third reason
for seeking security is to prevent the debtor from granting security to another
creditor, and thus subordinating the first creditor's claim.
III. EVOLUTION OF CANADIAN CHATTEL SECURITY LAW
The early common law was very hostile to non-possessory security
interests in personal property (typically a chattel mortgage or bill of sale, as
it used to be called). The common law treated them as presumptively or
conclusively fraudulent vis-a-vis the debtor's other creditors. 9 As perceived
by the courts, the mischief lay in the secured party permitting the debtor to
hold himself out as still exercising dominion over his chattels when in truth he
had "sold" them on a conditional basis to a creditor.
Although a radical change in attitude occurred in nineteenth-century
industrial England, the Canadian reaction was more ambivalent. On the one
hand, Canadian courts followed the liberating decisions of the House of Lords
0 and Tailby v. Official Receiver"
in Holroyd v. Marshall"
recognizing
respectively the validity in equity of a chattel mortgage on after-acquired
property and an assignment of future receivables. Conditional sale agreements, so important for the nascent instalment credit industry, and the fixed
and floating charge found an equally hospitable climate in Canada. In tandem
with these essentially provincial developments, the federal government also
incorporated in the Bank Act '2 the generous warehouse receipt provisions

9. See An Act Against Fraudulent Deeds, Alienations, Statute of 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1570)
(Eng.); Twyne's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601).
10. 10 H.L.C. 191; 138 Rev. Rep. 108 (1862).
11. 13 App. Cas. 523 (1888).
12. STAT. CAN. 1991, c. 46.
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which, in their expanded "Section 88" garb13 were to play such an important
role over the next century in encouraging the chartered banks to provide
inventory financing facilities to the Canadian timber, agricultural, mining and
other resource industries.
These strong pro-secured creditor developments were offset by the
introduction of burdensome registration and affidavit requirements for major
security devices. In short, the evolving attitudes of the common law and
equity courts were considerably more liberal than the suspicious minds of the
provincial legislatures.
The same ambivalence, only more so, was found in the United States,
whose chattel security law, prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial
Code ("UCC"), was fearsomely complex. 4 The great achievement of Article
9 of the UCC, easily the most innovative and radical of the nine substantive
articles of the Code, was to simplify, rationalize and modernize the American
law of secured transactions in personal property. Since the early 1960s,
Article 9 has been in force in all of the American states, with the exception of
Louisiana, a civil law jurisdiction. 5 Louisiana has since also joined the
Article 9 club.
Article 9 has also found a very congenial home in the Canadian common
law provinces in the form of the personal property security acts. 16 Ontario
was the first province to adopt such an act.' 7 Since then all the Western
Provinces (British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba), New
Brunswick, and the Yukon and Northwest Territories have followed suit. No
less striking is the fact that the new Quebec Civil Code, which came into
effect on January 1, 1994, has also incorporated many of the features of an
Article 9 regime.
The Canadian personal property security acts, although differing greatly
in detail and sometimes in substance, all share the following Article 9
characteristics. They substitute the generic concept of a security interest for
the multiplicity of security devices known to the common law or existing in
equity. Every security interest is now governed by the same rules of creation,
attachment, perfection, priorities and enforcement unless functional distinctions
justify the adoption of separate rules. In all the provinces a computerized
"real time" central registry system has replaced the old manually operated city

13. Id. § 427.
14. The story is beautifully told in 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL
PROPERTY ch. 1-8 (1965).
15. Article 9 was revised in 1972 and is currently in the course of a further revision.
16. See Jacob S. Ziegel, The New ProvincialChattel Security Regimes, 70 CAN. BAR REV.
681 (1991).
17. Personal Property Security Act, S.O., ch. 73 (1967) (Ont.). The Act was only fully
proclaimed in 1976 and was completely revised in 1989. See S.O., ch. 16, (1989); Ziegel, supra
note 16, at 686-89.
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or county based registries. Affidavits are abolished for all purposes. All that
is required to perfect a security interest by registration is the submission of a
one-page skeletal document called a "financing statement,"18 which will
remain valid for as long as the secured party wishes it to be'9 unless the
registration is previously discharged.
In short, in Canada secured parties have come as close to reaching
Nirvana as it is possible to do in an imperfect world.
IV. A HELPING HAND FROM BANKRUPTCY LAW

In the Canadian Constitution, primary responsibility for regulating
questions of bankruptcy and insolvency law rests with the federal government
pursuant to section 91(21) of the Constitution Act. The first comprehensive
Bankruptcy Act was adopted by the Canadian Parliament in 1919. It was
modelled on the British Bankruptcy Act of 1914 and followed the same
conceptual structure as the British Act.2' This meant that until the 1992
amendments to the BIA2' secured creditors continued to, and to a large extent
still, enjoy the same deference in bankruptcy as they enjoy outside bankruptcy.9

"Secured creditor" is broadly defined in section 2 of the BIA and
certainly encompasses all consensual forms of secured credit. Pursuant to
section 69.3(2), a secured creditor is not affected by the stay of proceedings
which applies to all other proceedings initiated against the bankrupt without
the court's consent. Instead, subject to a modest exception,23 the secured
creditor is free to demand release of the collateral and to realize or otherwise
deal with it as he would be entitled to outside bankruptcy. It is also

18. See e.g., Personal Property Security Act, S.O., ch. 16, § 45 (1989) (Ont.); R.R.O. 1990,
Reg. 912.
19. Personal Property Security Act, S.O. ch. 16, § 51(1) (1989) (Ont.).
20. The Canadian Act, however, did not adopt the British distinction between personal
bankruptcies and the winding up of insolvent companies; both proceedings are basically governed
by the same provisions. In Canada banks, trust companies, and other designated corporations
affected with a strong public interest can only be wound up under the Winding Up Act, R.S.C.,
ch. W-11, (1985) (Can.).
21. See BIA, ch. 27, 1992 S.C. 559 (Can.).
22. The relevant 1992 amendments are considered hereafter.
23. The trustee can seek a court order postponing the secured creditor's right of repossession
for a maximum period of six months. In practice such requests appear to be rarely made and,
if the reported cases are a reliable guide, are not often granted. Under the new commercial
reorganization provisions adopted in 1992 ( BIA Part III, Division 1), the automatic stay triggered
on the filing of a proposal, or notice of intention to file a proposal, applies to all creditors,
including secured creditors. See BIA, ch. 27, §§ 69.1-69.2, 1992 S.C. 616-620 (Can.).
However, this change does not appear to affect the relative priorities of consensually secured
claims and statutory lien claims in favor of public agencies discussed later in the paper.
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abundantly clear, subject to the rules against fraudulent preferences, 24 that a
security interest which is valid and enforceable before bankruptcy will be so
treated after the debtor's bankruptcy.' Most important, as will be explained
hereafter, the secured creditor's rights will not be subordinated to the claims
of the preferred classes of creditors established pursuant to section 136(1) of
the Act.
V. THE COUNTER-ATTACK: DEEMED TRUSTS AND SUPERPRIORITY CLAIMS
If the story ended here, this Paper would not be needed, and we could
conclude that Canada has indeed become a secured creditor's heaven. The
real picture, however, is considerably more complex. For more than twentyfive years, public authorities in Canada have reacted with increasing concern
to the monopolization of a debtor's assets by secured creditors and the debtors'
consequent inability to meet their liabilities to the Crown and its many
agencies. Until the 1992 amendments to the BIA, tax and similar governmental claims enjoyed preferred status under section 136(1) of the Act, but this
only meant they ranked ahead of ordinary and deferred creditors. They were
still subordinated to secured creditors.
To remedy what was perceived to be a serious inequity, the federal and
provincial governments counter-attacked.
The counter-attack took the
following forms. 6 First, legislation was adopted creating a lien or charge
in favor of the Crown against the debtor's assets which purportedly ranked
ahead of all other liens and charges. Second, where taxes or other dues had
been collected by the debtor on behalf of the taxing or assessing authority, or
had been deducted from the salary of an employee, the amounts in question
were deemed to be held in trust for the public authority.27 Third, under
section 224(1.2) of the Federal Income Tax Act, Revenue Canada was
authorized to require a third party owing money to a delinquent taxpayer to
make the payment to the federal government regardless of any prior claims
against the same funds.2"
24. BIA, R.S.C., § 95 (1985) (Can.). Fraudulent preferences are also regulated under
provincial assignments and preferences acts, and these have been held to be intra vires the
provinces. See Robinson v. Countrywide Factors Ltd., [1978] S.C.R. 753 (1977).
25. BIA, R.S.C., ch. B-3, § 72 (1985) (Can.).

26. See generally

ANNE E. HARDY, CROWN PRIORITY IN INSOLVENCY

(1986); Baird,

Statutory Trusts and Liens -- PriorityOver Claims of Secured Creditors,25 C.B.R. (N.S.) 261
(1978); W.A. Bogart, Statutory Claims and PersonalProperty SecurityLegislation:A Proposal
8 CAN. Bus. L.J. 129 (1983-84).
27. See, e.g., Income Tax Act, ch. 63, § 227(4), 1970-1971-1972 S.C. 1311, 1850 (Can.);
Canada Pension Plan Act, R.S.C., ch. C-8, § 23(3)-(4) (1985) (Can); Unemployment Insurance
Act, R.S.C., ch. U-1, § 57(2)-(3) (1985) (Can.); Employment Standards Act, R.S.O., ch. E-14
(1990), amended by ch. 16, S.O. 1991 (Ont.).
28. S.A. Roebuck, Revenue Canada'sNew Super Priorityfor Withholding, 69 C.B.R. (N.S.)
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The legislation under this ever expanding legislative network varied
widely, but the following beneficiaries were the most important: (1) federal
and provincial taxing authorities in respect of income taxes, provincial sales
taxes, federal goods and services tax (GST), and premiums payable under the
federal Unemployment Insurance Act and the Canada Pension Plan Act;
(2) workers' compensation boards in respect of assessments against employers
under provincial workers' compensation legislation; and (3) employees in
respect of wages and other benefits owing to them pursuant to employment
standards acts. A notable feature about these legislative intrusions is the fact
that only rarely were they brought about by changes in the personal property
security acts themselves; 2 9 it seems rather as if consensual and non-consensual security interests were travelling in different orbits.
Nevertheless, consensually secured creditors were not about to throw in
the towel, and they quickly took issue with provisions they regarded as deeply
inimical to their legitimate interests. They fought their battles in the courts
and in the legislative halls. Each of these fora must be examined separately.
V. SUPERPRIORITY AND DEEMED TRUST PROVISIONS IN THE COURTS
The outcome of the judicial struggles differed greatly depending on
whether the statutory provisions were being challenged outside or inside the
debtor's bankruptcy. If the debtor is not bankrupt, no constitutional issue
exists because the rules governing competing property claims fall preeminently
under the provinces' property and civil rights power under section 92(13) of
the Constitution Act. The due process clause in the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms30 does not protect economic rights. 3'
Secured creditors' lawyers were therefore remitted to interpretational
arguments, and for the most part, they met with very sympathetic judicial ears.
Thus, a provision conferring priority on a statutory tax lien was deemed to be
only prospective in its effect and not to override existing interests,32 and a
deemed trust was recognized only if the debtor had in fact kept the collected
33 (1988).
29. An exception appears in § 30(7) of the Ontario Personal Property Security Act. This
section provides that a security interest in an account or inventory and its proceeds are
subordinate to the interest of a person who is the beneficiary of a deemed trust arising under the
Ontario Employment Standards Act or the Pension Benefits Act. Comparable provisions are
found in several of the other Personal Property Security Acts. All the provincial acts also have
a provision, like Ontario's § 4(1)(a), stating that the act does not apply to a lien given by statute
or rule of law unless otherwise provided.
30. CAN. CONT. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. 1 (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms)

§7.
31. PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA Vol. II, at 33-8 (looseleaf) (3d ed.
Supp.).
32. Board of Indus. Relations v. Avco Fin. Serv. Realty Ltd., [1979] 2 S.C.R. 699.
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taxes in a separate account.3 3 Even fancier arguments have been used in
restricting the federal government's garnishment powers under the Income Tax
Act." These are familiar interpretational problems in many branches of law
and basically raise the same question: how far should courts go in interpreting
tolerably plain language to avoid what seems to them an offensive result?
With some notable exceptions, Canadian judges yielded when government
drafters rewrote the legislation to make it clear the tax lien had priority over
existing as well as future security interests and that the validity of a deemed
trust did not depend on the debtor keeping the money in a separate account or
the government being able to trace the collected funds through equitable
tracing rules.
Constitutional issues arise where the debtor is in bankruptcy and the BIA
provisions come into conflict with provincial legislation creating superpriority
liens and establishing deemed trusts in favor of provincial government claims.
As previously mentioned, the federal government has the responsibility for
bankruptcy and insolvency legislation. However, this fact does not preclude
the provinces from adopting overlapping legislation if it can be justified as an
exercise of provincial powers in respect of "property and civil rights" under
section 92(13) of the constitution. Where such duplicative provisions exist,
the paramountcy doctrine established under section 91 of the constitution
comes into play. The courts must then decide whether the federal and
provincial legislation can coexist or whether the provincial legislation must
yield to the supremacy of the federal enactment. When confronted with the
issue, the "pronounced" tendency of the Supreme Court of Canada has been
to apply the paramountcy doctrine narrowly and leave inefficiencies resulting
from duplicative legislation to be resolved by political means.35 The accepted
test of incompatibility is whether the federal and provincial laws contradict
each other, so making it impossible for the citizen to comply with both laws
at the same time.36 Unlike the United States courts, Canadian courts have not
adopted a preemption test in applying the paramountcy doctrine.

33. Dauphin Plains Credit Union Ltd. v. Xyloid Indus. Ltd. [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1182.
34. See e.g., Re Pembina on the Red Development Corp., 85 D.L.R. 4th 29 (Man. Ct. App.
1991); Re Lloyds Bank Can., 60 D.L.R. 4th 272 (Alta. Ct. App. 1989); Canada Trusts Mort.
Corp. v. Port O'Call Hotel, Inc., 24 C.B.R. (3d) 257 (Alta. Ct. App. 1994).
35. See HoGG, supra note 31, at Vol. 1, ch. 16.2. A striking example of such accommodation
in the bankruptcy area is found in Robinson v. Countrywide Factors, Ltd., [19781 1 S.C.R. 753
(1977). In Robinson, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the voidable preferences
provisions in the Saskatchewan Assignments and Preferences Act even though substantially the
same ground is covered in the Federal Bankruptcy Act. See BIA, R.S.C., ch. B-3, §§ 91-95
(1985) (Can.).
36. In Smith v:The Queen, [1960] S.C.R. 776, 800, Justice Martland stated the test as being
whether "compliance with one law involves breach of the other." See also HOGG, supra note
31, at ch. 16.4.
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The compatibility of the provincial Crown liens and deemed trust
provisions with the Federal Bankruptcy Act was decided by the Supreme Court
in a series of cases in the 1980s. In Deputy Minister of Revenue (Quebec) v.
Rainville,3" the Quebec government claimed to be a secured creditor in the
distribution of the bankrupt's assets. Quebec argued that under its legislation
its claim for unpaid sales taxes was treated as a secured claim (privilege) that
satisfied the definition of secured creditor in the Bankruptcy Act. A majority
of the Supreme Court denied Quebec's claim on the ground that section
107(1)() of the Bankruptcy Act38 made it clear that a claim for unpaid taxes
was to be treated as a preferred claim and not as a secured claim.39
In rendering the majority judgment, Justice Pigeon stressed that section
107(1)() made it clear the Crown's claim was limited to that of a preferred
creditor "notwithstanding any statutory preference to the contrary." This left
open the question of whether other provincial Crown claims, governed not by
section 107(1)(j) but by section 107(1)(h) and not containing the same
exclusionary language,' were also restricted to preferred creditor status.
The issue came before the Supreme Court in Deloitte Haskins and Sells Ltd.
v. Workers' Compensation Board.4 This case involved a claim to superpriority status conferred on the Alberta Workers' Compensation Board under
Alberta legislation for unpaid assessments otherwise falling under section
107(1)(h). A majority of the Supreme Court, this time speaking through
Justice Wilson,4" held it made no difference because Parliament intended to
restrict all the claims enumerated in section 107(1)(a) - (]) to preferred creditor
status. The Supreme Court reaffirmed this interpretation in FederalBusiness

37. [1980] 1 S.C.R. 35 (1979).
38. Section 107 read in relevant part:
(1) Subject to the rights of secured creditors, the proceeds realized from the
property of a bankrupt shall be applied in priority of payment as follows:
(j) claims of the Crown not previously mentioned in this section, in right of
Canada or any province, par!passu notwithstanding any statutory preference to the
contrary.
Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C., ch. B-3, § 107 (1970) (Can.).
39. Justice Estey dissented because he believed § 107(1)0) was not intended to preclude the
provincial Crown from claiming secured creditor status if it met the definition of secured creditor
in the Bankruptcy Act. Rainville, [1980] 1 S.C.R. at 49-50.
40. Section 107(1)(h) stated that:
"all indebtedness of the bankrupt under any Workmen's Compensation Act,
under any Unemployment Insurance Act, under any provision of the Income Tax
Act ... creating an obligation to pay to Her Majesty amounts that have been
deducted or withheld, paripassu."
41. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 785.
42. Justice Estey again dissented essentially on the same grounds he articulated in Rainville.
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Development Bank v. Commission de la Sante et de la Securite du Travail,43
another Quebec appeal, which involved a claim for unpaid sales taxes.
British Columbia v. Henfrey Samson Belair Ltd.' was the last of the
quartet of Supreme Court decisions to be decided in the 1980s. Its policy
implications for the provinces were even more serious than the rule enunciated
by the Court in the three earlier decisions. The issue in Henfrey Samson was
not the constitutionality of a provincial superpriority provision, but the validity
of a deemed trust provision involving sales taxes collected by an auto dealer
pursuant to British Columbia's Social Services Tax legislation (SSTA)4 5 but
not remitted by the dealer before it became bankrupt. Section 18(1) of the Act
provided that sales taxes collected by a vendor were deemed to be held in trust
for the province and were deemed to be held separate from the vendor's assets
whether or not they were kept separate by the vendor. Section 18(2) provided
that taxes held in trust, or required to be collected and remitted by the vendor,
46
were to form a lien and charge on the vendor's entire assets.
The vendor had failed to segregate the collected taxes. Nevertheless,
relying on a line of lower court decisions, the province argued its deemed trust
claim was justified under section 47(a) of the old Bankruptcy Act,47 and that
it did not have to invoke the lien provisions in the SSTA. Section 47(a)
provided the property of a bankrupt divisible among his creditors did not
comprise property held by the bankrupt in trust for any other person.
A divided Supreme Court rejected the Crown's argument and overruled
the contrary lower court decisions. Writing for the majority, Justice
McLachlin expressed the view that sections 107(1) and section 47(a) of the
Bankruptcy Act had to be read harmoniously as part of a coherent scheme of
distribution of the bankrupt's assets."8 Section 47(a) was concerned with the
preservation of rights established by general principles of trust law whereas
section 107(1)0) was concerned with statutorily created claims of the federal
and provincial governments for unpaid taxes. It was for the federal government, she reasoned, to determine the meaning of concepts and principles
appearing in the Bankruptcy Act, and that meaning could not be changed by
provincial legislation. 49 There was no doubt in her mind that Section 47(a)
was meant to be limited to true trusts and to identifiable assets. Justice Cory,
dissenting, favored a more elastic reading of section 47(a). He took a more
realistic view of the dilemma facing the Crown if its in rem claim was

43. [1988] 1 S.C.R. 1061.
44. [1989] 2 S.C.R. 24.
45. Social Service Tax Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 388 (1979) (B.C.).
46. This provision was clearly addressed to the likelihood of a vendor not having segregated
the collected taxes from other monies received by him.
47. See BIA, R.S.C., ch. B-3, § 67(a) (1985) (Can.).
48. See Henfrey Samson, [1989] 2 S.C.R. at 30-32.
49. Id. at 35.
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restricted to taxes that could actually be traced at the time of the vendor's
50
bankruptcy.
VI. CRITIQUE OF THE SUPREME COURT JUDGMENTS

Secured creditors had long opposed the Crowns' attempts to trump
secured creditors' claims through the adoption of "self-serving" superpriority
claims and deemed trust provisions. Thus, they welcomed the Supreme Court
decisions as vindicating their position."' Whatever one may think about the
cases as an exercise in statutory interpretation, there should be no illusions
about their policy and practical implications. Four such consequences are of
particular importance.
The first consequence is that it leads to forum shopping. Secured
creditors will put a debtor into bankruptcy for the sole purpose of avoiding
provincial superpriority claims and deemed trust provisions even though the
debtor's other creditors will derive no benefit from it. Such bankruptcy
proceedings are commonplace in Canada today and, surprising as it may seem,
2
the courts have refused to interfere by denying the bankruptcy petition.
A second consequence is that the constitutional decisions lead to uneven
results. These decisions do not impair the federal government's power to
adopt superpriority and deemed trust provisions in non-bankruptcy legislation
and to make it clear that they shall apply after a bankruptcy as well as before
it. Such provisions are becoming increasingly common and the courts are still
wrestling with the consequential interpretational issues. 3
The third objection to the constitutional decisions is that they turn chattel
security policy on its head. For the most part, and outside the areas covered
by section 427 of the Federal Bank Act, provincial law governs the creation
and recognition of chattel security interests, and provincial law also determines

50. For further discussion of the judgments, see Jacob S. Ziegel, The Supreme Court of
CanadaScuttles the Deemed Trust in Bankruptcy, 15 CAN. Bus. L. J. 498 (1989).
51. Some lawyers tried to push secured creditors' luck even further by arguing that the quartet
of Supreme Court decisions also undermined the validity of the long standing provisions in
provincial chattel security Acts invalidating unperfected security interests against trustees in
bankruptcy. See Andrew J. Roman and M. Jasmine Sweatman, The Conflict Betveen Canadian
ProvincialPersonalProperty Security Acts and the FederalBankruptcy Act, 71 CAN. B. REV.
77 (1992). But see Jacob. S. Ziegel, PersonalProperty Security and Bankruptcy: There is No
War! A Reply to Roman and Sweatman, 72 CAN. B. REv. 44 (1993).
52. See, e.g., Re Harrop of Milton Inc., 92 D.L.R. 3d 535 (Ont. 1979). Re Bank of Montreal
and Scott Road Enterprises Ltd., 57 D.L.R. 4th 623 (B.C. Ct. App. 1989). Indirectly, the BIA
appears to sanction the practice since § 13.4 allows the trustee to act for a secured creditor in
enforcing the secured creditor's claim subject to certain safeguards being met.
53. See e.g., Re 1653 Investments Ltd., 129 D.L.R. 3d 582 (B.C. 1981); Attorney General
of Canada v. Samson Belair Ltd., 17 D.L.R. 4th 544 (B.C. Ct. App. 1985). Some of the
decisions may no longer be relevant in light of the recent amendments to the federal provisions.
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priorities among competing interests. Canadian bankruptcy law has long
recognized this reality. 54 It is anomalous, therefore, that provincial law is
precluded from subordinating provincially created consensual security interests
to Crown liens in bankruptcy as well as outside it. Although provincial law
may be schizophrenic in taking with the right hand what is given with the left,
it is for the provinces and not federal law to resolve this conflict.
The last objection is that the invalidation of provincial priority rules in
bankruptcy is repugnant to what influential bankruptcy scholars believe is a
basic postulate of bankruptcy policy. 5 These scholars believe bankruptcy
law's primary function is to prevent piecemeal dismemberment of an
insolvent's estate, to provide an orderly and efficient procedure for the
gathering in and liquidation of the debtor's assets, and to distribute the net
proceeds among the creditors. According to this school of thought, prebankruptcy rights and obligations should be recognized in bankruptcy and only such
substantive changes should be permitted as are essential for the realization of
bankruptcy's primary goals.
The merits of the above arguments are contestable. In particular, there
are bankruptcy theorists and lenders who view the adoption of substantive
policies as a legitimate goal for federal bankruptcy law. They may in fact see
it as intrinsic to the national character of bankruptcy legislation. However, the
theoretical aspects of the invalidation of provincial lien provisions have
received scant attention in Canada. The constitutional battles have largely
been viewed as proxies for the much broader public choice debate involving
the inherent merits of Crown liens and whether they should be given
superpriority status at any time, whether in or outside of bankruptcy and
whether pursuant to provincial or federal law. It is to this larger canvass that
I must now turn.
VII. THE PROS AND CONS OF CROWN PRIORITIES
Since the publication of the Report of the Study Committee on Bankruptcy

and Insolvency Legislation in 1970,56 there has been a vigorous debate in
Canada about the priority position of Crown claims.57
Before describing

54. See BIA, R.S.C., ch. B-3, § 72(1) (1985) (Can.) (stating the "Act shall not be deemed
to abrogate or supersede the substantive provisions or any other law or statute relating to property
and civil rights that are not in conflict with Ithe BIA].").
55. For example, see Morris G. Shanker, The Use and Abuse of FederalBankruptcy Power
26 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 3 (1975). THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF
BANKRUPTCY LAW (1986).
56. Report of the Study Committee on Bankruptcy and Insolvency Legislation 112-13, 122-23
(Ottawa 1970).
57. See id. See also Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, Report on the Crown as
Creditor: Priorities and Privileges L.R.C. 57 (1982);
Canada, Proposed Bankruptcy
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the positions taken by the protagonists on either side of the debate, it is
important to distinguish between those critics who would deny any priority to
Crown claims and those who would retain the Crown's preferred creditor
position in what was section 136(1) of the pre-1992 Bankruptcy Act.
One might have expected consensual secured creditors to have acquiesced
in the federal and provincial governments and their various agencies retaining
their status as preferred creditors, or at least to be neutral with respect to it,
since they were not prejudiced by it. As we have seen, the quartet of Supreme
Court decisions strongly protected secured creditors from provincial attempts
to bypass the rankings established in section 136(1). Nevertheless, in the
ongoing debate over the past twenty-five years secured creditors have been
firmly opposed to any preferential treatment of Crown claims, whether with
respect to ordinary creditors or with respect to secured creditors.
Secured creditors' voices have overshadowed the views of unsecured
creditors. Secured creditors presumably calculated that it was better to take
a principled position than to concede any merit in the argument favoring
preferential treatment of Crown claims. A bystander might also have detected
an element of Machiavellianism. In Canada, when a secured creditor holds,
or a combination of secured creditors hold, a security interest in all or
substantially all of a debtor's assets, on the debtor's bankruptcy there is
usually nothing left over to be divided among the bankrupt's unsecured
creditors. This being the case, it matters little to the latter group whether the
Crown is treated as a preferred creditor or is remitted to the bottom of the
ladder with the other unsecured creditors. The pickings for both will be
equally slim.
The arguments against giving Crown claims secured status, and afortiori
superpriority status, are fairly straightforward. Crown claimants, it is argued,
can diversify their risks over large numbers of taxpayers and can contain their
losses by better policing of debtors. It is also contended that conferring
priority, superpriority, or deemed trust status on Crown claims suffers from
all the evils of secret liens and is profoundly unfair to consensual secured
creditors in two ways. First, secured creditors have no reliable means of
determining the existence of Crown claims at the time they advance the funds.
Second, the emergence of superpriority claims after the secured creditor has
changed its position totally undermines the value of the secured creditor's
security. From the secured creditor's perspective, it does not matter whether
the Crown's claim appears in the guise of a deemed trust or whether it is

Amendments-Report of the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy and Insolvency 78-79 (1986);
HARDY, supra note 26, at ch. 6; Susan J. Cantlie, PreferredPriorityin Bankruptcy, in CURRENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW ch. 17
(Jacob S. Ziegel ed., 1994).
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described in the legislation as a lien that takes priority over every other claim
against the same collateral.
The various government departments and agencies have been just as
vigorous in arguing their case. 8 It is pointed out that, unlike consensual
creditors, the Crown cannot choose its debtors and that the Crown has a duty
to taxpayers to collect what is owing. Canadians should not be asked to
assume further burdens in the name of risk diversification. The suggestion
that better policing of debtors would reduce the Crown's losses is dismissed
as empty rhetoric because of the reduced staffing of government revenue
offices in a time of fiscal restraints and the lack of realism in expecting the tax
collector constantly to stand guard over taxpayers.
Representatives of Revenue Canada and its provincial counterparts also
forcibly argue that deemed trusts, since they involve monies actually received
by the debtor, should be treated differently from unpaid taxes. Such funds are
essentially in the same position as proceeds from the disposition of collateral
under a security agreement, which are protected under all the provincial
personal property security acts.59 It is objected that the Supreme Court's
decision in Henfrey Samson' encourages collusion between the secured
creditor and the debtor to ensure that collections made by the debtor on behalf
of the Crown go to swell the funds available to satisfy the secured creditor's
claim and therefore to reduce the contingent liability of the debtor's senior
officers on guarantees given the secured creditor.
VIII. BILL C-22 AMENDMENTS
These arguments and counter-arguments came to a head in Bill C-22 and
its important amending provisions to the Bankruptcy Act enacted by the
Canadian Parliament in 1992. The federal cabinet found itself in the invidious
position of having to mediate between the anti-Crown position generally
favored by the bankruptcy branch of the Department of Consumer and
Corporate Affairs (the federal department responsible for the administration
of bankruptcy legislation) and the pro-Crown position urged by Revenue
Canada and its provincial allies.
The federal government struck a compromise between the competing
positions in a fairly complex set of provisions whose effect was as follows. 6'
58. For one recent scholarly exposition, see B.J. Skulski, The Deemed Trust and Enhanced
Provisions of the Excise Tax Act and Their Application in Relation to the Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Act (1994) (unpublished memorandum, on file with the author). For an earlier and
much cited defense of the Crown's position, see Morris G. Shanker, The WorthierCreditors(And
a Cheerfor the King), 1 CAN. Bus. L. J. 340 (1975-76).
59. See, e.g., Personal Property Security Act, S.O., ch. 16, § 25 (1989) (Ontario). See the
broad definition of "proceeds" in § 1(1) of the Act.
60. [1989] 2 S.C.R. 24.
61. The summary that follows is not meant to be an exhaustive treatment. The summary
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First, section 136(1) was revised to eliminate preferred creditor status for
federal and provincial claims for unpaid taxes and for all other Crown claims
treated as preferred under the pre-1992 provisions. Second, federal and
provincial legislation conferring secured creditor status on a Crown claim,
other than in relation to claims where a non-Crown creditor would be entitled
to claim a security interest, is made ineffectual in bankruptcy62 unless the
security interest is registered before the debtor's bankruptcy or the initiation
by the debtor of reorganization proceedings under the BIA pursuant to a
prescribed system of registration.
Even where the security interest is registered, it is subordinated to prior
perfected security interests and is only valid with respect to the amount owing
to the Crown at the time of registration.63
The third important set of changes are introduced in section 67 of the
BIA. Section 67(2) denies deemed trust status to trusts created under federal
or provincial legislation in favor of the Crown unless the property or funds
would be treated as being held in trust in the absence of such legislation.
Section 67(3) introduces an important qualification. This section retains
deemed trust status for monies collected or deducted by the bankrupt on behalf
of the Federal Crown pursuant to section 227(4) - (5) of the Income Tax Act,
sections 23(3) - (4) of the Canada Pension Plan Act, or sections 57(2) - (3) of
the Unemployment Insurance Act, and comparable provincial legislation.
It will be seen, then, that significant victories have been won by both
parties to the dispute. Non-Crown creditors have been vindicated in their
long-held position that a Crown debt should not be entitled per se to preferred
treatment. Thus, if the Crown wants to achieve secured creditor status, the
Crown will have to comply with the perfection requirements applicable to all
other security interests and be governed by similar priority rules.
The Crown has secured an important victory in the adoption of section
67(3). Its effect is to reverse the Supreme Court's decision in Henfrey
Samson, and to protect the Crown's superpriority claims against all assets held
by the debtor at the time of bankruptcy for collected but not remitted taxes and
for deductions made by the debtor. Since these, in addition to the goods and
services tax (GST) claims,' are the most common form of Crown claims in

ignores changes in priority affecting non-Crown claims, in particular the 30-day priority given
unpaid suppliers of goods in §§ 81.1 and 81.2 of the BIA. The summary also omits the federal
government's failure to resolve the Parliamentary deadlock over the best way of protecting the
claims of unpaid wage earners. Bill C-22 contained a separate chapter for the establishment of
a contributory wage earnerprotection fund, but it was strongly opposed by the government's own
supporters as well as members of the opposition parties and was dropped in the final bill.

62. See BIA, ch. 27, § 86, 1992 S.C. 628-29 (Can.).
63. Id. § 87(2)(a)-(b), 1992 S.C. 629-30.
64. GST claims are not included in § 67(3) of the BIA-an important omission. See Skulski,
supra note 58.
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bankruptcy, secured creditors will have a smaller incentive to put the debtor
into bankruptcy than heretofore.
The 1992 Act requires the Federal Parliament to review the BIA three
years after the 1992 amendments come into effect.' The requirement was
added to enable Parliament to receive a report from the government on
operational experience under the 1992 amendments and to determine what
further amendments are desirable to the parent Act. In May 1993 the
Department of Industry established an advisory committee, known as BIAC,
to assist the government in preparing its report to Parliament. Working
groups, established by BIAC, have been busy assessing the position and
preparing recommendations. It can be confidently predicted that, while
victories have been won and defeats have been inflicted, the war is far from
over. Consensual secured creditors and Crown claimants remain deeply
antagonistic to each other and will continue to agitate for improvements in
their respective positions.
But what of the constitutional position? Because the 1992 amendments do
not discriminate between federal and provincial Crown claims, the amendments have masked the tension between provincial aspirations for superpriority
status and the federal government's ultimate veto power as guardians of section
91(21) of the constitution. The provincial authorities' best hope must be that
strong self-interest will continue to align the federal and provincial positions
and that the secured creditors' lobby will not succeed in driving a wedge
between them.

65. BIA, ch. 27, § 92, 1992 S.C. 659.
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